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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Passavant Retirement & Health Center requests that we 
review a decision of the National Labor Relations Board 
which concluded that Passavant committed an unfair labor 
practice violating section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), (5). 
Passavant refused to bargain with the General Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 
538 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 
the certified exclusive bargaining representative of a group 
of Licenced Practical Nurses,1 working as Passavant's 
Charge Nurses. The Board cross-petitions us to enforce its 
decision. Because we find that the LPN Charge Nurses are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Standard nomenclature for nurses is LPN, for Licensed Practical 
Nurse, and RN, for Registered Nurse. 
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supervisors under the Act, we will grant Passavant's 
Petition For Review, reverse the Board's ruling, and deny its 
Petition to Enforce. 
 
I. 
 
Passavant is a continuing care retirement community, 
providing various levels of nursing services in its skilled 
nursing facility, separate assisted-living units, and 
independent-living apartments and cottages. The facility is 
under the overall supervision of an Executive Director. 
Directly below the Executive Director in Passavant's 
hierarchy is the Director of Clinical Services, who 
supervises the Independent Living Supervisor and the 
Director of Nursing. The Director of Nursing has an 
Assistant Director of Nursing, and both oversee the House 
Supervisors. Under the House Supervisors are the Head 
Nurses, who in turn supervise the Charge Nurses. The 
remainder of the nursing staff includes Nurses Aides and 
Resident Assistants. In the Independent Living portion of 
the facility, the Independent Living Supervisor directly 
oversees the Charge Nurses and Resident Assistants 
working there. Passavant's Nurses Aides and Resident 
Assistants are already governed by a collective bargaining 
agreement. 
 
The Union originally petitioned for representation of all 
Passavant's LPNs. LPNs work alongside Registered Nurses 
as Charge Nurses and Head Nurses. To avoid confusion, it 
is worth noting that "Head Nurse" and "Charge Nurse" are 
job titles at Passavant, and the terms "Registered Nurse" 
and "Licenced Practical Nurse" denote different degrees of 
state licensure. The LPNs and RNs employed in those 
positions perform the same duties, except that RNs are 
qualified to perform a few more medical procedures such as 
drawing blood, and inserting feeding tubes and intravenous 
tubes. The Union amended its petition to exclude LPN Head 
Nurses from the proposed bargaining unit, as it recognized 
that they were supervisors, but did not amend the petition 
to include RNs employed as Charge Nurses. Thus, the 
bargaining unit here comprises only LPN Charge Nurses. 
 
While the representation petition was before the NLRB 
Regional Director, Passavant moved to transfer the 
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proceeding to the Board, which had scheduled oral 
argument in two cases that also concerned the supervisory 
status of nurses. See Nymed, Inc., d/b/a Ten Broeck 
Commons, 320 N.L.R.B. 806 (1996); Providence Hosp., 320 
N.L.R.B. 717 (1996). After finding that the LPN Charge 
Nurses were not supervisors and were an appropriate 
bargaining unit, the Regional Director denied Passavant's 
Motion to Transfer and ordered a representation election. 
 
Passavant appealed the Regional Director's decision to 
the Board. Meanwhile, after an election, the ballots were 
impounded pending the Board's ruling. The Board denied 
Passavant's Request for Review, concluding that the 
Regional Director's analysis followed the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 
511 U.S. 571, 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994), and Board precedent. 
 
The impounded ballots were then counted, and the Union 
won the election. The Regional Director certified the Union 
as the exclusive bargaining representative of Passavant's 
LPN Charge Nurses. The Union requested that Passavant 
enter into collective bargaining, but Passavant refused. The 
Union then filed unfair labor practice charges with the 
Board, and the Board's General Counsel filed a Complaint 
against Passavant. The Board granted the General 
Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that 
Passavant had violated the NLRA by refusing to bargain. 
Passavant Retirement and Health Center, 323 N.L.R.B. No. 
99 (Apr. 30, 1997). 
 
The underlying decision of the Regional Director as to the 
representation election is before us pursuant to section 9(d) 
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. S 159(d). We have jurisdiction over 
this appeal under 29 U.S.C. S 160(e), (f). Our standard of 
review is deferential. We will uphold the Board'sfindings of 
fact if supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 
whole: 
 
       "The Board's findings are entitled to respect; but they 
       must nonetheless be set aside when the record before 
       a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the Board's 
       decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the 
       worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed 
       judgment on matters within its special competence or 
       both." 
 
                                4 
  
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490, 71 
S. Ct. 456, 466 (1951). We exercise plenary review over 
questions of law and the Board's application of legal 
precepts, Tubari, Ltd. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 
1992); however, "[b]ecause of the Board's`special 
competence' in the field of labor relations, its interpretation 
of the Act is accorded special deference." Pattern Makers' 
League of N. Am., AFL-CIO, 473 U.S. 95, 100, 105 S. Ct. 
3064, 3068 (1985). Moreover, a determination of "[w]hether 
a [bargaining] unit is appropriate involves a large measure 
of informed discretion vested in the Board and is rarely to 
be disturbed." St. Margaret Mem'l Hosp. v. NLRB, 991 F.2d 
1146, 1152 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
II. 
 
The Board concluded that by refusing to bargain with the 
Union, Passavant engaged in an unfair labor practice in 
violation of section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor 
Relations Act: 
 
       (a)  It shall be an unfair labor practice for an e mployer 
       -- 
 
       (1)  to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in 
       the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of 
       this title; 
 
       ... 
 
       (5)  to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
       representatives of his employees, subject to the 
       provisions of section 159(a) of this title. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), (5) (emphasis added). "The term 
`employee' shall include any employee ... but shall not 
include ... any individual employed as a supervisor ...." 29 
U.S.C. S 152(3). The meaning of the term supervisor, of 
course, determines this case. In interpreting that term we 
turn first to the statute itself, which defines a "supervisor" 
as: 
 
       "any individual having authority, in the interest of the 
       employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, 
       promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other 
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       employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust 
       their grievances, or effectively to recommend such 
       action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise 
       of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical 
       nature, but requires the use of independent judgment." 
 
29 U.S.C. S 152(11). 
 
If the LPN Charge Nurses fall within the Act's definition 
of supervisors, then it was not an unfair labor practice to 
refuse to bargain with them. Only two of our past decisions 
are relevant to this question. Neither, however, directly 
resolves the issue. In Tressler Lutheran Home for Children 
v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 1982), after analyzing 
a First Amendment challenge, we noted that factually 
"[t]here is substantial evidence that [the LPNs] were not 
supervisory personnel." In NLRB v. Konig, 79 F.3d 354 (3d 
Cir. 1996), we did not reach the supervisory issue because 
the employer had waived it by failing to raise it properly. 
 
Historically, the Board utilized a test for the supervisory 
status of nurses based on the "interests of the employer" 
language of section 2(11). Beverly Enterprises--Ohio d/b/a 
Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 493-94 (1993). 
That test "examines whether the alleged supervisory 
conduct of the charge nurses is the exercise of professional 
judgment incidental to patient care or the exercise of 
supervisory authority in the interest of the employer." Id. at 
493. 
 
The Supreme Court rejected this analysis in Health Care. 
First, the Court set forth the proper framework for 
determining the supervisory status of employees: 
 
       "[T]he statute requires the resolution of three 
       questions; and each must be answered in the 
       affirmative if an employee is to be deemed a supervisor. 
       First, does the employee have authority to engage in 
       one of the 12 listed activities? Second, does the 
       exercise of that authority require `the use of 
       independent judgment'? Third, does the employee hold 
       the authority `in the interest of the employer'?" 
 
Health Care, 511 U.S. at 573-74, 114 S. Ct. at 1780. The 
Court then reasoned that the Board's "patient care" test 
was inconsistent with the NLRA: 
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       "[T]he Board has created a false dichotomy--in this 
       case, a dichotomy between acts taken in connection 
       with patient care and acts taken in the interest of the 
       employer. That dichotomy makes no sense. Patient 
       care is the business of a nursing home, and it follows 
       that attending to the needs of the nursing home 
       patients, who are the employer's customers, is in the 
       interest of the employer. We thus see no basis for the 
       Board's blanket assertion that the supervisory 
       authority exercised in connection with patient care is 
       somehow not in the interest of the employer." 
 
511 U.S. at 577-78, 114 S. Ct. at 1782 (citation omitted). 
Its conclusion does not render the interest of the employer 
requirement meaningless, however. Rather, the statutory 
"language ensures, for example, that union stewards who 
adjust grievances are not considered supervisory employees 
and deprived of the Act's protections." Id. at 579, 114 S. Ct. 
at 1783. 
 
Health Care was decided on very narrow grounds. It did 
not interpret the meaning of "independent judgment" or 
"responsibly to direct." Instead, the Court agreed with the 
Board that those phrases "are ambiguous, so the Board 
needs to be given ample room to apply them to different 
categories of employees." Id. The Court also noted that "in 
applying S 2(11) in other industries, the Board on occasion 
reaches results reflecting a distinction between authority 
arising from professional knowledge and authority 
encompassing frontline management prerogatives." Id. at 
583, 114 S. Ct. at 1785. Finally, the Court noted that its 
decision "casts no doubt on Board or court decisions 
interpreting parts of 2(11) other than the specific phrase `in 
the interest of the employer.' " Id. 
 
Since Health Care, the Board has purported to analyze 
the supervisory status of "charge nurses the same as all 
other employee classifications and shall apply to them the 
same test [it] applies to all other employees." Nymed, 320 
N.L.R.B. at 810. In doing so, the Board has come to lean 
heavily upon the question of nurses' independent judgment 
to determine their supervisory status. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he 
LPNs do not exercise independent judgment in making 
assignments or directing the work of the [certified nursing 
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assistants]."); Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 727 ("As 
with every supervisory indicium, assignment must be done 
with independent judgment before it is considered to be 
supervisory under Section 2(11)."). 
 
III. 
 
We need not enumerate every duty performed by 
Passavant's LPN Charge Nurses to conclude that they are 
supervisors. Only one of the twelve statutory indicia need 
be shown to support a finding of supervisory status. Health 
Care, 511 U.S. at 573, 114 S. Ct. at 1780. Here, upon the 
Board's own findings we can conclude that the LPN Charge 
Nurses exhibit two of the twelve possible statutory criteria 
of a supervisor, i.e., disciplinary authority and adjustment 
of grievances, and that those attributes were exercised 
using independent judgment, and in the interests of the 
employer. 
 
A. Supervisory Criteria 
 
The Board concluded that Passavant's Charge Nurses 
possessed the authority to send Aides home for flagrant 
conduct violations, such as resident abuse. Earlier, in a 
nonhealth care case, we determined that this type of 
authority is clearly disciplinary in nature. See Warner Co. v. 
NLRB, 365 F.2d 435, 439 (3d Cir. 1966) ("It can scarcely be 
denied that sending a man home is discipline ...."). The 
Board does not refer us to any authority that contradicts 
this rule. The only Board precedent we have found is Dad's 
Foods, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 500, 500-501 (1974) (The "limited 
authority ... to discharge employees for intoxication on the 
job and involvement in a fight ... is only a very restricted, 
and sporadic kind of authority, limited to certain specific 
predetermined kinds of misconduct. We do not believe that 
`authority' so narrowly confined both in time and scope, if 
it can be said to exist at all, is sufficient to establish 
supervisory status."). Our jurisprudence, however, is to the 
contrary and leads us to conclude, based on the Board's 
own factual findings, that Passavant's LPN Charge Nurses 
indeed possessed the authority to discipline. 
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The Board also opined that the "charge nurses can 
resolve minor problems or `gripes' raised by[nurses aides] 
and resident assistants concerning daily assignments, 
break time[s] and the like," but were not involved in the 
formal grievance procedure. "[I]t is the higher management 
authority, rather than LPN charge nurses who are the 
decision makers with respect to the responses and 
positions taken by the Employer concerning these [formal] 
grievances." Thus, the Board implicitly reasoned that 
resolving "gripes" does not rise to the level of adjusting 
grievances under the NLRA. This determination is 
consistent with other Board decisions. See Ohio Masonic 
Home, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 390, 394 (1989) ("[T]he fact that 
the charge nurses sometimes rely on their personal 
relationship with employees to resolve minor complaints 
regarding workload, the scheduling of lunches and breaks, 
or personality conflicts is insufficient to establish 
supervisory status."); Beverly Enters. d/b/a Beverly Manor 
Convalescent Ctrs., 275 N.L.R.B. 943, 946 (1985) ("The 
LPNs rely on their personal relationship to the employees to 
resolve problems informally. ... This facet is insufficient to 
elevate them to supervisory status."); see also Illinois 
Veterans Home at Anna, L.P., 323 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 156 
L.R.R.M. 1105, 1107 (June 6, 1997) (requiring role in 
formal grievance procedure). 
 
Passavant argues that the adjustment of even minor 
grievances is enough to support a finding of supervisory 
authority, again citing our decision in Warner. We agree. In 
Warner, a building supplies business employed drivers and 
shippers, both supervised by a Yard Manager. The drivers 
were already unionized, and the employer opposed the 
shippers' efforts to establish a union. Testimony revealed 
that the steward of the drivers' union often approached the 
shippers to settle minor complaints. We rejected the 
Board's conclusion that this activity did not amount to the 
adjustment of grievances: "Those so-called `minor 
complaints' are such disputes as fairly fall under the 
provision of the drivers' contract, and which would amount 
to `grievances' if reduced to writing." Warner, 365 F.2d at 
438. 
 
Here, the collective bargaining agreement between 
Passavant and the Nurses Aides includes sections 
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pertaining to assignments, break times, and lunch breaks. 
Additionally, its definition of "grievance" is very broad. Just 
as in Warner, the LPN Charge Nurses at Passavant have the 
authority to adjust the Aides' grievances and meet the 
"supervisory" criterion. 
 
B. Independent Judgment 
 
Because we have concluded that Passavant's LPN Charge 
Nurses exhibit two of the statutory criteria, we must now 
decide whether they exercised that authority with 
independent judgment. We conclude that they did. 
 
The Board found that "the authority to suspend 
employees for flagrant violations such as the abuse of 
patients is not an indicium of supervisory authority 
because no independent judgment is involved because the 
offenses are obvious violations of the Employer's policies 
and speak for themselves." (App. at 94a n.53 (citation 
omitted).) This conclusion is also found in several other 
Board decisions, including Northcrest: 
 
       "[M]any cases indicate that charge nurses have 
       authority to suspend employees for flagrant violations 
       such as drunkenness or abuse of patients. The Board 
       has not found this an indicium of supervisory status 
       because no independent judgment is involved; the 
       offenses are obvious violations of the employers' 
       policies and speak for themselves. ... Accordingly, in 
       making future supervisory determinations, we have 
       decided that whether a ... suspension relates to patient 
       care or not, it will be examined only as to ... in the case 
       of suspension for flagrant violation, whether 
       independent judgment was involved." 
 
313 N.L.R.B. at 497-98; accord Manor West, Inc. 313 
N.L.R.B. 956, 959 (1994). We, however, rejected a similar 
argument in Warner, saying: "It can scarcely be denied that 
sending a man home is discipline or that it does require the 
use of independent judgment." 365 F.2d at 439. We see 
little to commend a distinction based upon how flagrant the 
violation happens to be. Here, this type of dismissal could 
not be considered a routine or clerical function; it consists 
of a Charge Nurse imposing her independent judgment 
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upon, and exercising her authority over a subordinate, 
however subtle or flagrant the violation. 
 
Similarly, we found in Warner that a supervisor exercises 
independent judgment when resolving grievances:"What we 
are concerned about here is the fact that the shippers do 
resolve disputes over working conditions on behalf of their 
employer, exercising independent judgment, and thus 
`adjust grievances' for the purposes of the Act." Id. at 438. 
Although we afford deference to the Board, we are not at 
liberty to ignore our own jurisprudence, which dictates our 
decision. 
 
Finally, we are not creating a per se rule that LPNs are 
supervisors. Each case requires a detailed factual 
application of the twelve statutory criteria. Nor do we take 
issue with any of the Regional Director's factual, findings.  
We do, however, reject its application of the law to the 
facts. 
 
IV. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the Charge Nurses' authority to 
send Aides home for flagrant violations is an exercise of 
discipline, and when they dispose of minor gripes, they are 
adjusting grievances; and in both, they are exercising 
independent judgment. Additionally, the parties do not 
dispute that this authority is exercised in the interest of the 
employer. Under these circumstances, we hold that the LPN 
Charge Nurses are supervisors within the meaning of the 
Act. Accordingly, we grant Passavant's Petition for Review, 
reverse the Board's order, and deny its Petition to Enforce. 
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